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Abstract | The concept of consciousness continues to defy definition and elude the grasp of philosophical and 
scientific efforts to formulate a testable construct that maps to human experience. Severe acquired brain 
injury results in the dissolution of consciousness, providing a natural model from which key insights about 
consciousness may be drawn. In the clinical setting, neurologists and neurorehabilitation specialists are called 
on to discern the level of consciousness in patients who are unable to communicate through word or gesture, 
and to project outcomes and recommend approaches to treatment. Standards of care are not available to 
guide clinical decision‑making for this population, often leading to inconsistent, inaccurate and inappropriate 
care. In this Review, we describe the state of the science with regard to clinical management of patients with 
prolonged disorders of consciousness. We review consciousness‑altering pathophysiological mechanisms, 
specific clinical syndromes, and novel diagnostic and prognostic applications of advanced neuroimaging and 
electrophysiological procedures. We conclude with a provocative discussion of bioethical and medicolegal 
issues that are unique to this population and have a profound impact on care, as well as raising questions of 
broad societal interest.
Giacino, J. T. et al. Nat. Rev. Neurol. advance online publication 28 January 2014; doi:10.1038/nrneurol.2013.279
Introduction
Disorders of consciousness (DOC) present both clini-
cal challenges of diagnosis and treatment and unique 
opportunities for fundamental scientific discoveries 
about the nature of human consciousness.1 Moreover, 
advances in the assessment and rehabilitation of patients 
with the severe brain injuries that produce DOC have 
a t remendous impact on medical practice and ethics.2–4
In this Review, we provide an overview of recent 
advances in the neurobiology, diagnosis and treatment 
of DOC, including the use of novel neuroimaging and 
electro physiological assessments. We also discuss the 
medicolegal and ethical issues surrounding these advances 
that will influence the medical care of patients with DOC.
What is consciousness?
Many definitions of consciousness have been proposed, 
none of which completely avoids an element of tautology 
or self-reference. However, a definition closely follow-
ing that of William James (1894)5 is useful for framing 
DOC across a continuum.6 According to James, “at its 
least, normal human consciousness consists of a seri-
ally time-ordered, organized, restricted and reflective 
awareness of self and the environment. Moreover, it is an 
experience of graded complexity and quantity.” Missing 
from this definition, however, is the intimate linkage 
between arousal level, which indexes both unconscious 
and conscious brain states (including stages of sleep from 
unconscious stage 3 slow-wave sleep to the conscious 
imagery of rapid eye movement [REM] sleep, levels of 
responsiveness across the range of DOC, and vari ations 
in the effects of anaesthetics from coma to light sed-
ation), and the core neuropsychological components of 
normal, awake, conscious brain function that provide the 
contents of consciousness (a range of specific functional 
types of attention, intention, memory, awareness and 
mood–emotion). Broadly speaking, DOC affect both 
arousal level and the contents of consciousness.
Disorders of consciousness
DOC can result from focal brain injuries that induce 
widespread functional changes, or from more-global 
injuries. DOC are categorized largely on the basis of 
observable behavioural features and their inferred 
relation ship to level of consciousness—diagnostic 
taxono mies based on pathophysiological mechanisms 
have not yet been developed. DOC exist on a contin-
uum, and patients may or may not transition sequentially 
through each state of consciousness.
Accurate differential diagnosis is essential to the clini-
cal management of patients with DOC. Diagnosis drives 
the approach to treatment, and is strongly associated 
with functional outcome.7,8 Augmentative communica-
tion training, for example, should be deferred until the 
patient transitions to MCS and demonstrates evidence 
of language comprehension. The clinical examination 
should be designed to identify the key distinguishing 
features (Table 1), so that the prognosis can be estab-
lished and appropriate therapeutic interventions initiated 
as early as possible.
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Coma
Coma is usually the result of severe, diffuse, bihemispheric 
lesions of the cortex or underlying white matter, bilateral 
thalamic damage, or focal lesions of the paramedian teg-
mentum. The defining clinical feature of coma is the com-
plete loss of spontaneous or stimulus-induced arousal. No 
sleep–wake cycles are evident on EEG, the eyes remain 
continuously closed, and there is no speech or purposeful 
motor activity, following commands or sensory stimula-
tion.9 Coma is a self-limiting state that typically resolves 
within 2 weeks and transitions into either a vegetative 
state (VS) or a minimally conscious state (MCS).
Vegetative state
VS is a condition of wakeful unconsciousness. The diag-
nosis of VS is made when spontaneous eye-opening re-
emerges (signalling recovery of the reticular activating 
system), despite the continued absence of any discernible 
evidence of language comprehension, verbal or gestural 
communication, or reproducible purposeful behavioural 
responses to visual, auditory, tactile or noxious stimuli.10 
The term persistent VS (PVS) is applied when VS per-
sists for at least 1 month. PVS is considered to be perma-
nent 3 months after non-traumatic brain injury, or after 
12 months following traumatic injury. Because recovery 
of consciousness commonly occurs 3–12 months post-
injury,11,12 the Aspen Neurobehavioural Conference 
Workgroup suggested that the term ‘PVS’ should be 
abandoned, recommending instead that the term ‘VS’ 
should be used in association with the aetiology of the 
injury (traumatic or non-traumatic) and the length of 
time since onset, as these factors have been shown to 
influence outcome.7,13
Minimally conscious state
MCS is a condition of severely altered consciousness 
character ized by minimal but definite behavioural evi-
dence of self or environmental awareness.14 MCS usually 
exists as a transitional state reflecting improvement 
in consciousness following coma or VS, or progressive 
decline as in neurodegenerative disease. The typical lesion 
profile consists of grade II or III diffuse axonal injury with 
multifocal cortical contusions, sometimes accompanied 
by thalamic involvement. In comparison to patients diag-
nosed with VS, thalamic lesions are notably less prevalent 
in MCS.15 The relative preservation of long-range cortico-
thalamic connections might explain why patients in MCS 
retain the capacity for cognitive processing.
Diagnosis of MCS is based on clearly discernible and 
reproducible evidence of simple command-following, 
intelligible speech or recognizable “yes–no” responses 
(verbal or gestural), and/or nonreflexive behaviours that 
are selectively triggered by specific environmental stimuli. 
Examples of the latter behaviours include sustained visual 
pursuit of an object or person, smiling or crying follow-
ing exposure to emotional stimuli (for example, family 
photographs) but not neutral stimuli (for example, photo-
graphs of objects), vocalizations or gestures that occur in 
direct response to verbal or gestural prompts, reaching 
toward objects placed within the field of view, and manual 
manipulation of objects placed in the hand. The hallmark 
feature of MCS is response inconsistency; that is, the 
examiner may elicit clear evidence of volitional behav-
iour on one examination, but fail to do so during a sub-
sequent examination conducted hours or even minutes 
later. Serial assessment is frequently required to capture 
sufficient evidence of MCS, because the behaviour of 
interest might occur infrequently, or could be a mbiguous 
or masked by concurrent complications.
Akinetic mutism (AM) is a subtype of MCS, in which 
the failure to follow commands, speak and engage in 
other goal-directed behaviour is due to severely dimin-
ished drive, rather than decreased arousal or direct 
damage to neural systems responsible for mediating 
these behaviours. In AM, speech, movement, thought 
and emotional expression are uniformly reduced16,17 
but, unlike in MCS, these responses may be facilitated 
following exposure to high-intensity sensory or person-
ally salient stimuli. This phenomenon is exemplified 
in the so-called ‘telephone effect’, originally described 
by C. Miller Fisher.18 Some patients with AM, who are 
otherwise mute and behaviourally non-responsive when 
verbally prompted, will speak fluently and conversation-
ally over the telephone. Fisher suggested that the dis-
criminative sensory cues associated with this behaviour 
(for example, the telephone itself, or the ringing sound), 
coupled with the over-learned act of speaking on the tele-
phone, might produce a temporary reversal of the severe 
decrease in drive that arises from marked downregulation 
of the ‘mesencephalo frontal activating system’—an earlier 
i teration of the mesocircuit model described below.
DOC must be differentiated from locked-in syndrome 
(LIS), a rare condition caused by damage to corticospinal 
and corticobulbar pathways that spares consciousness and 
cognition but leaves the patient aphonic and quadriplegic.9 
Vertical eye movements and blinking are typically spared, 
allowing eventual breakthrough of gaze-based communi-
cation and expression of high-level cognition.19–21 The 
efferent loss of speech and movement in LIS is often 
misattributed to disturbance in consciousness, leading to 
frequent misdiagnosis.22 Further complicating matters, in 
some cases LIS presents as VS or MCS in the acute stage 
and subsequently evolves into the classic LIS syndrome.23,24
Key points
 ■ Disorders of consciousness (DOC) arise from direct perturbations of neural 
systems that regulate arousal and awareness, and indirectly from disruptions 
in the connections between these systems
 ■ Distinct clinical syndromes have been identified, but behavioural features often 
fluctuate and cross diagnostic borders within individual patients, probably 
reflecting aberrant dynamic changes in corticothalamic neuronal activity
 ■ Novel applications of functional neuroimaging and electrophysiological 
techniques have been employed to detect covert signs of conscious awareness, 
improve outcome prediction, and establish brain–computer interfaces to 
augment communication ability
 ■ Recent empirical evidence suggests that treatment interventions aimed at 
neuromodulation can accelerate recovery and enhance outcome during both 
the acute and chronic phases
 ■ A paradigm shift should change the pervasive nihilism that continues to 
complicate patient management, family adjustment, medicolegal issues and 
healthcare policy in relation to DOC
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Acute confusional state
Emergence from MCS is signalled by the re-emergence 
of a functional communication system or restora-
tion of the ability to use objects in a functional manner. 
Operationally, recovery of communication is demon-
strated by reliable yes–no responses to questions con-
cerning personal orientation (for example, “is your name 
Bill/Jim?”) or situational orientation (for example, “are 
you sitting in a chair/bathtub?”). Functional object use 
is assessed by testing instrumental praxis (for example, 
“show me how to use a cup/hairbrush”).
Patients newly emerged from MCS remain acutely 
confused and disoriented, and may be prone to epi-
sodes of agitation—a condition termed acute confu-
sional state (ACS). The full constellation of symptoms 
associ ated with ACS includes temporal and spatial 
disorientation, distractibility, anterograde amnesia, 
impaired judgement, perceptual disturbance, restless-
ness, sleep disorder, and emotional lability. Formal 
criteria have recently been proposed to establish the 
onset and resolu tion of the post-traumatic confusional 
state,25 and specific symptoms of ACS have been linked 
to functional outcome.26 Coexisting peripheral and cor-
tical sensory impairments (for example, deafness, blind-
ness) and cognitive dysfunction (for example, apraxia, 
agnosia) and language disturbance (for example, 
aphasia) should be ruled out as contributing or causa-
tive factors in patients who fail to meet the criteria for 
reliable communication ability or functional object 
use, although this is often difficult to accomplish on 
bedside examination.
Neurobiology of consciousness
Creating and maintaining the conscious state
Much recent effort has focused on the neurobiological 
underpinnings of the conscious state, beginning with 
experimental studies isolating the roles of several core 
brainstem, basal forebrain and hypothalamic systems 
in supporting variations in neuronal firing patterns 
across the entire corticothalamic system in relation to 
different levels of arousal.27–29 Most investigators agree 
that the awake conscious state is fundamentally identi-
fied with highly energy-demanding activity within the 
corticothalamic system.29–32 These energy demands 
derive strongly from complex, high-frequency neuronal 
firing patterns associated with depolarization of corti-
cal, thalamic and striatal membrane potentials.29,33,34 
Large reductions in arousal level in normal individuals 
involve broad hyperpolarization of these neurons via 
withdrawal of excitatory neuromodulatory influences 
from orexinergic, cholinergic, noradrenergic and other 
brainstem, basal forebrain and hypothalamic systems.27–29 
Such hyperpolarization of cortical and thalamic neurons, 
as progressively occurs across deeper stages of sleep (or 
with broad inhibitory effects of anaesthesia), markedly 
shifts the firing patterns of these neuronal populations, 
and influences the overall pattern of corticothalamic 
dynamics toward more-synchronous and dynamically 
stereotyped waves of activity compared with the more 
spatiotemporally differentiated patterns associated with 
the wakeful conscious state.35
The mechanistic link between consciousness and 
the more depolarized, activated and spatiotempo-
rally complex activated state has not been formulated. 
Nonetheless, several key requirements have been pro-
posed, particularly with respect to the types of brain 
activity that correlate with conscious brain states,36 
the timescales of specific neurophysiological processes 
that are consistent with psychophysiological measure-
ments of awareness, and the role of global availability 
of information across the brain.31 Experimental studies 
that focus on contrasts between nonconscious and con-
scious processing of information in normal individuals 
demonstrate that conscious brain activity is typically 
associated with widely distributed brain regions within 
the prefrontal and parietal cortex, the sensory areas of 
which show synchronous activity and late amplification 
of activity.31 Such processes are posited to be necessary 
for an abstract distributed dynamic activity, known as the 
global workspace, to have access to sensory or internal 
cognitive representations and maintain activation over 
hundreds of milliseconds.
Table 1 | Characteristic clinical features of disorders of consciousness
Disorder Arousal and attention Cognition Receptive 
language
Expressive language Visuoperception Motor function
Coma No sleep–wake cycles* None None None None Primitive reflexes only
Vegetative 
state
Intermittent periods of 
wakefulness*


















Aspontaneous and limited 































Normal to near‑normal Normal Aphonic Normal Tetraplegia
*Key distinguishing features. ‡Locked‑in syndrome is not a disorder of consciousness, but is included here for purposes of comparison with syndromes associated with significant disturbance 
in consciousness.
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A study utilizing transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) has found evidence for a graded measure of con-
sciousness in normal individuals and patients with DOC. 
Rosanova, Gosseries and colleagues37 employed high-
density EEG to measure waves of brain activity induced 
by TMS pulses. In normal individuals, time-averaging of 
the EEG signal after each repetitive TMS pulse generates 
a reproducible wave pattern of activity that correlates with 
unconscious brain states, including non-REM sleep and 
pharmacologically induced coma. In unconscious, veg-
etative patients, the TMS responses tend to be very locally 
generated, or are more widespread but stereotypical and 
dynamically simple. Healthy controls in the wakeful con-
scious state, or during REM sleep, d emonstrate complex, 
longer-lasting EEG responses to TMS.
Casali, Gosseries et al.36 devised a novel empirical 
measure, the perturbational complexity index (PCI), to 
quantify these TMS–EEG responses, and have demon-
strated its potential as a unified measurement scale to 
grade the level of consciousness. The PCI incorporates 
the theoretical requirement that wakeful consciousness 
involves integration of information across multiple brain 
regions, with highly differentiated activity occurring 
locally within separate regions. The PCI is a normalized 
measure that shows high values only if the initial TMS 
perturbation alters activity in a large set of integrated 
brain regions, each of which then reacts differently over 
time. In studies of patients with DOC, a graded increase 
in PCI values was demonstrated across individuals with 
different levels of consciousness.
Common pathophysiological mechanisms
DOC can be framed in the context of basic mechanisms 
underlying the state of neurons within the cerebral cortex, 
thalamus and striatum, and at the circuit level of network 
mechanisms. All severe brain injuries produce widespread 
deafferentation and reduced input to neurons across the 
corticothalamic system. At one extreme, if all inputs to 
the cerebral cortex are removed, only very low-frequency 
electrical activity (or none at all) may be seen.38 Typically, 
such complete or near-complete deafferentation is only 
seen in severe anoxic injuries, and most DOC arise in the 
setting of partially connected corticothalamic systems. 
Neurons in the cortex, thalamus and striatum are very sen-
sitive to the amount of synaptic background activity that 
they receive,29,34,39 and can change patterns of firing or cease 
firing in response to small shifts in membrane potential. 
Patients with DOC might not demonstrate the necessary 
neuronal dynamics to establish brain activity states con-
sistent with conscious awareness, which seem to require a 
sufficient number of connected neurons to be driven into 
a depolarized state that allows local processing and long-
range synchronization with other brain regions. When 
such capacities are preserved in patients with DOC, the 
interplay between diurnal variations in neuromodulatory 
tone in the thalamus and cortex and the degree of deaffer-
entation of large segments of the corticothalamic system 
probably accounts for often wide behavioural fluctuations.
A common circuit-level mechanism has been proposed 
to account for transitions across the DOC continuum. The 
mesocircuit model (Figure 1) posits that anterior forebrain 
function is markedly downregulated in all severe brain 
injuries as a result of widespread disconnection or neuro-
nal death. A crucial role is proposed for neurons within 
the central thalamus that are known to show progressive 
deafferentation in proportion to the severity of structural 
brain injuries.40 At the mesocircuit level, broad reduction of 
corticostriatal, thalamocortical and thalamostriatal outflow 
is expected to produce sufficient loss of afferent input to the 
medium spiny neurons (MSNs) of the striatum to prevent 
these neurons from reaching their firing threshold.34 
A combination of effects of direct deafferentation of central 
thalamic neurons and active inhibition of some of these 
cells by the globus pallidus interna, as a result of the loss of 
their active inhibition from the MSNs in the striatum, con-
spire to produce broad reductions in global cerebral synap-
tic activity, as reflected in the very low c erebral m etabolic 
rates that are typical in patients with DOC.1
Expressed behaviour and level of conscious content 
increase with restoration of normal patterns of activity 
in the anterior forebrain mesocircuit.41 The mesocircuit 
model also offers a unifying account of the effects of 
several activating medications used in DOC and novel 
strategies such as deep brain stimulation (DBS), all of 
which have the first-order effect of restoring activity 
of frontal cortical, striatal and central thalamic neurons 
and releasing organized behaviours. In addition, the model 
draws a direct connection across similar shifts in frontal 
cortical and striatal activation during the sleep–wake 
cycle, and paradoxical behavioural activation observed 
during the early stages of anaesthesia.35,41
Figure 1 | The mesocircuit model. A common mechanism for downregulation of the 
anterior forebrain mesocircuit in severe brain injuries. Reduction of thalamocortical 
and thalamostriatal outflow following deafferentation and loss of neurons from the 
central thalamus withdraws important afferent drive to the medium spiny neurons 
of the striatum, which may then fail to reach firing threshold because of their 
requirement for high levels of synaptic background activity. Loss of active inhibition 
from the striatum allows neurons of the globus pallidus interna to tonically fire and 
provide active inhibition to their synaptic targets, including relay neurons of the 
already strongly disfacilitated central thalamus, and possibly also the projection 
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Several specific predictions of the mesocircuit model 
have been supported by recent studies. Importantly, 
stronger downregulation of anterior forebrain activity 
measured via EEG in zolpidem-responsive individu-
als across the aetiological spectrum of brain injuries 
is consistent with the model.42 Similarly, activation of 
high-frequency 15–40 Hz activity over frontocentral 
regions in association with the zolpidem response,42 on 
spontaneous recovery from severe brain injuries,43 and 
with electrical stimulation of the central thalamus44 all 
support predictions of the model. In addition, a study of 
32 patients with severe injuries demonstrated a reversal 
of globus pallidus and central thalamic resting meta-
bolic signals, satisfying a key prediction of the model.45 
The mesocircuit model also predicts that activation 
of the central thalamic neuronal population is a final 
common pathway supporting a downregulated ant-
erior forebrain in severe brain injuries, and thus offers 
a mechanism for the response to central thalamic DBS.46
Diagnostic challenges
Diagnostic accuracy is critical to designing an appropri-
ate plan of care, establishing an accurate prognosis, and 
providing appropriate information to caregivers.19,47 
Unfortunately, diagnostic error is common among 
patients with VS and MCS. Reports consistently find that 
approximately 30–40% of people diagnosed with VS actu-
ally retain conscious awareness.48–50 Misdiagnosis may 
contribute to premature withdrawal of life- sustaining 
care and lead to inappropriate medical manage ment (for 
example, neglect of pain treatment). The risks associated 
with early misdiagnosis are highlighted by a Canadian 
study, which found that 70% of the deaths reported in six 
level I trauma centres were attributable to withdrawal of 
life-sustaining therapy, with half occurring within the first 
72 h of injury.51 The failure to detect conscious awareness 
may also limit access to special ized neurorehabilitative 
services, as many insurance policies will not authorize 
admission to a rehabilitation programme for individuals 
believed to be unconscious.
The lack of a ‘gold standard’ for detection of con-
scious awareness is the most prominent confounding 
factor for diagnostic assessment. In the absence of an 
objective test of consciousness, diagnostic impressions 
are based on behavioural observations at the bedside. 
Behaviour is, however, an unreliable proxy for conscious-
ness.19,52 Interpretation of the significance of a specific 
behaviour reflects the subjective bias of the observer 
and is a by product of the range of behaviours sampled 
(narrow versus broad), the frequency of assessments 
performed (one-off versus serial), and the parameters 
established for response interpretation (q ualitative versus 
operationally defined).
A second source of diagnostic error arises from patient-
specific characteristics. Underlying peripheral and cor-
tical sensory deficits, neuromuscular impairments, 
fluctuations in arousal level, cognitive dysfunction, sub-
clinical seizure activity, and occult illness may all mask 
conscious awareness.19,52 Environmental factors that con-
strain the patient’s behavioural response repertoire—for 
example, use of restraints or sedating medications—may 
also bias the diagnostic impression.
Various approaches have been employed to discern 
levels of consciousness in behaviourally non-responsive 
and non-communicative patients. Neurobehavioural 
assessment methods are most commonly employed in 
clinical practice, in view of their availability, low cost and 
ease of use. Structural and functional neuroimaging strat-
egies and electrophysiological techniques have garnered 
scientific and clinical attention in light of increasing evi-
dence that they can detect active cognitive processing in 
the absence of behavioural signs of consciousness.53–55
Behavioural assessment
Neurobehavioural rating scales
Neurobehavioural rating scales rely on standardized 
administration and scoring procedures to detect subtle 
but important behavioural signs of consciousness. Scales 
designed for this purpose have generally been shown to 
have good reliability and validity, although other impor-
tant psychometric properties such as sensitivity and 
specificity, and positive versus negative predictive value, 
have not been adequately investigated. An evidence-based 
review of neurobehavioural rating scales designed specifi-
cally for patients with DOC was recently completed by 
a task force of the American Congress of Rehabilitation 
Medicine. The task force identified six scales (of the 
13 reviewed) that seem to be sensitive for detecting 
conscious awareness (Table 2).50 The Coma Recovery 
Scale—Revised (CRS-R)56 received the strongest recom-
mendation (“minor reservations”) of those reviewed, on 
the basis of psychometric properties deemed important 
for clinical assessment.
IQBA
Individualized quantitative behavioural assessment 
(IQBA) employs single-subject experimental design to 
address case-specific questions, and is intended to com-
plement comprehensive neurobehavioural assessment. 
This method of assessment is particularly useful when 
behavioural responses are ambiguous or infrequent.49,57
In IQBA, behaviours of interest are operationally 
defined and tested under varying conditions constructed 
to address a specific question. For example, one can ask 
whether movement of the thumb is volitional by testing 
the frequency of thumb movement following a command 
to move the thumb (volitional condition) or another part 
of the body (noise condition), and in the absence of any 
command (rest condition). Differences in the frequency 
of the target behaviour can then be tested statistically 
to determine whether the rate of occurrence is signifi-
cantly greater in one condition relative to the others. If 
the analysis indicates that the frequency of movement 
is significantly higher in the volitional condition rela-
tive to the noise and rest conditions, the behaviour is 
very likely to be under volitional control.57,58 IQBA can 
be adapted to address a broad range of questions and 
has been shown to be useful for detection of command-
following, visual field deficits, hemispatial neglect, and 
medication effects.59–61
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Neuroimaging strategies
While behavioural assessment of DOC remains the 
gold standard, neuroimaging permits objective docu-
mentation of CNS damage after acquired brain injury. 
From a scientific standpoint, neuroimaging studies 
aid our understanding of the neural correlates of 
human consciousness. From a clinical perspective, they 
provide additional information concerning diagnosis, 
prognosis and the course of recovery of conscious-
ness, and can serve as surrogate markers for novel 
therapeutic interventions.
Structural imaging
MRI is the method of choice to visualize the location 
and extent of brain damage in chronic DOC. In the 
acute setting, however, CT scanning may be preferred, 
owing to its accessibility, speed of acquisition, and sen-
sitivity to acute haemorrhage or lesions that require 
immediate surgery.62 Standard T1-weighted structural 
MRI assessments cannot reliably differentiate VS from 
MCS, but voxel-based morphometry analyses may allow 
this distinction in the near future. Older studies have 
shown the possible prognostic value of ‘classic’ structural 
MRI sequences to predict DOC outcome; for example, 
the presence of corpus callosum and dorsolateral brain-
stem lesions correlates with lack of recovery at the group 
level.63 However, recently developed quantitative diffu-
sion tensor imaging (DTI) techniques, which permit 
assessment of structural white matter damage, have 
been shown to outperform clinical markers in predict-
ing 1-year functional outcome at the individual-patient 
level in patients with traumatic64 or anoxic65 brain injury. 
In our view, DTI-MRI techniques offer a unique oppor-
tunity to quantify the structural integrity of the white 
matter, and can also quantify the primary and secondary 
axonal damage encountered in DOC.66
Functional neuroimaging
Key advances in our understanding of DOC have come 
from the use of functional imaging. Depending on the 
technique employed, functional neuroimaging can 
measure the brain’s metabolic activity (for example, by 
use of 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose PET, [FDG-PET] or MRI 
spectroscopy), haemodynamic activity (for example, by 
use of H2
15O-PET or functional MRI [fMRI]) or elec-
trical activity (for example, EEG, evoked potentials or 
magneto encephalography). Depending on the acquisi-
tion conditions, these approaches can measure resting 
or active brain function, the latter through either passive 
external stimulation or active cognitive paradigms.
PET imaging
FDG-PET studies in ‘resting state’ conditions were 
the first to demonstrate massive decreases in brain 
metabolism in DOC. In VS, FDG-PET classically shows 
a reduction of brain function to 40–50% of normal 
values.1 Voxel-based studies indicated that the lateral 
and medial frontoparietal associative cortices are the 
most hypo metabolic areas,67 and recovery of conscious-
ness seems to be characterized by recovery of activity 
in this frontoparietal ‘awareness network’.68 More-recent 
studies have used automated classifiers for the analysis of 
FDG-PET data, permitting calculation of the probabil-
ity that individ ual patients are conscious (‘locked in’) or 
unconscious (VS).69 At the single-patient level, FDG-PET 
cannot disentangle VS from MCS, but group studies have 
shown that CRS-R total scores correlate with meta bolic 
activity in the awareness network.70 Within this network, 
frontoparietal midline structures are thought to be 
important for internal, stimulus-independent or ‘self ’ 
consciousness, whereas lateral frontoparietal cortices 
seem to be critical for external or sensory awareness.71 
The latter network seems to be relatively preserved in 






















































































Levels of evidence for diagnostic studies: class I, cohort survey with prospective data collection, includes a broad spectrum of people at risk of developing the outcome of interest, employs 
objective outcome assessment, inclusion criteria are well‑defined, and at least 80% of people enrolled have the risk factor and the outcome measure; class II, cohort study with retrospective 
data collection or case–control study, includes a broad spectrum of people with and without the risk factor and the outcome, and the risk factor and outcome are determined objectively and 
independently; class III, cohort or case–control studies that include a narrow spectrum of patients with or without the disease in which the diagnostic test result and disease status are 
determined objectively and independently or by different investigators; class IV, studies that do not include people suspected or known to have or not have the disease, the reference standard 
is undefined or not independent, and there are no calculable measures of diagnostic accuracy or precision. For further information about evidence classification, the interested reader is 
referred to the American Academy of Neurology Guideline Process Manual.209 Abbreviations: CRS‑R, Coma Recovery Scale—Revised; DOCS, Disorders of Consciousness Scale; SMART, 
Sensory Modality and Rehabilitation Technique; SSAM, Sensory Stimulation Assessment Measure; WHIM, Wessex Head Injury Matrix; WNSSP, Western Neurosensory Stimulation Profile.
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MCS (compared with VS), possibly reflecting recovery 
of voluntary interaction with the environment.70 Patients 
who are considered to be in MCS because they display 
nonreflexive behaviour but fail to follow commands 
(a condition newly termed MCS-MINUS)72,73 have been 
shown to have metabolic dysfunction in the dominant 
left-hemispheric language network,74 possibly related to 
the presence of aphasia.
H2
15O-PET studies suggest that VS represents a global 
disconnection syndrome in which the awareness net-
works are functionally disconnected from primary corti-
cal areas.75,76 By contrast, patterns of activation observed 
in patients in MCS indicate preservation of large-scale 
cortical networks associated with auditory77,78 and 
pain79 processing.
Functional MRI
In recent years, PET activation studies have been largely 
superseded by non-ionizing fMRI techniques. Activation 
fMRI studies using auditory, tactile or visual stimuli have 
shown near-normal high-level cortical activation in MCS 
and low-level activation in VS (reviewed elsewhere1). The 
minority of patients in VS who exhibited high-level activa-
tion often showed clinical signs of recovery at long-term 
follow-up.80–82 Despite their potential value as prognostic 
markers, the diagnostic value and interpretation of activa-
tion fMRI studies in DOC in terms of the presence or 
absence of residual consciousness have remained contro-
versial. Indeed, in the absence of a full understanding of 
the neural correlates of consciousness, deficient cortical 
activation to external stimuli does not necessarily prove 
the absence of consciousness.83
‘Active’ fMRI paradigms have been developed to probe 
for possible motor-independent signs of command- 
following.84 Patients with DOC are asked to perform 
cognitive tasks in motor (for example, “imagine playing 
tennis”), visuospatial (for example, “imagine walking 
around in your house”) or visual (for example, “look at 
the face”) domains.21,85–89 This approach provided an 
opportunity to ask yes–no questions to a patient with 
an initial clinical diagnosis of VS (but later shown to be 
in MCS).85 It should be stressed, however, that many 
of the tested patients in MCS who showed behavioural 
signs of command- following failed to show a response to 
these active fMRI tests, leading to false-negative findings. 
Because this approach depends on adequate processing 
and performance of the cognitive task, these paradigms 
cannot document residual consciousness in patients with 
severe sensory, cognitive or language impairment.90
Task-free ‘resting-state’ blood oxygen level-dependent 
(BOLD) fMRI measurements have also been performed in 
DOC.91,92 Recording of spontaneous fluctuations in BOLD 
fMRI activity under unstimulated conditions has identified 
various functional networks, some of which are thought to 
represent conscious cognitive activity.71,93,94 The best-studied 
network is the default mode network (DMN) encompassing 
the posterior and anterior cortical midline structures, which 
are considered to be involved in stimulus- independent 
thought, mind-wandering and self- consciousness.95 The 
DMN was shown to be absent in brain death,96 but still 
partially preserved in VS,97–99 probably reflecting residual 
structural connectivity.93 At the group level, resting-state 
network activity revealed reduced interhemispheric con-
nectivity100 and correlated with levels of consciousness in 
patients with DOC (Figure 2).97 At the single- patient level, 
however, it fails to reliably distinguish VS from MCS, and 
contamination by motion or other artefacts can impede the 
identification of true neuronal activity.99
The arterial spin labelling (ASL) technique allows non-
invasive measurement of resting-state cerebral blood flow. 
A recent ASL-MRI study in patients in MCS showed a pro-
found decrease in blood flow in anterior cortical midline 
structures.101 Finally, MRI spectroscopy, a measure of 
biochemical changes in the brain, has uncovered severe 
metabolic cortical102 and thalamic103 neuronal dysfunction 
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Figure 2 | DMN connectivity correlates with level of consciousness. a | Areas 
showing a linear correlation between DMN connectivity and consciousness levels, 
ranging from healthy controls, to minimally conscious, vegetative then comatose 
patients. Results are rendered on the mean T1 structural image of the patients. 
b | Mean z‑scores and 90% CI for DMN connectivity in PCC/precuneus, 
temporoparietal junction, medial prefrontal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus 
across patient populations. Locked‑in syndrome patient z‑scores are displayed for 
illustrative purposes as additional blue circles overlaid on control population data. 
Abbreviations: DMN, default mode network; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex. 
Vanhaudenhuyse, A. et al., Default network connectivity reflects the level of 
consciousness in non‑communicative brain‑damaged patients, Brain 133,  
161–171 (2010), by permission of Oxford University Press.
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Electrophysiology
In the DOC context, EEG can be used to predict outcome, 
evaluate residual cognitive function, detect conscious-
ness, and provide a means to communicate with the 
outside world without using muscular channels.106,107 
In coma, visual analysis of EEG recordings can identify 
epileptiform activity, guide treatment, and help estab-
lish prognosis (especially in anoxic cases).108,109 In DOC, 
visual analysis of the EEG classically shows global slowing 
of electrogenesis but fails to differentiate VS from MCS 
or predict outcome. Quantitative EEG (qEEg) tech-
niques process the data and retrieve features not visible 
on the raw traces. qEEG has shown group-level differ-
ences between VS and MCS in time domain, power 
spectrum, connectivity,110,111 entropy112 and bispectral 
index113,114 measurements, but does not presently offer 
reliable diagnostic or prognostic information at the 
single-patient level.
Long-duration EEG monitoring permits evalu-
ation of the important interaction between arousal and 
conscious ness in DOC.115 A 24-h polysomnography 
study observed behavioural (eyes open or closed) but 
not electrophysiological sleep–wake patterns in VS.116 
Using high-density EEG, a homoeostatic decline of EEG 
slow-wave activity through the night (possibly reflecting 
residual synaptic plasticity) and periods of REM sleep 
(possibly reflecting ‘dreaming’) could be demonstrated 
in MCS but not in VS.117
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are averaged EEG 
epochs to external or cognitive events.118 In comatose 
patients, the absence of a cortical response to electri-
cal stimulation of the median nerves during somato-
sensory ERP recordings is associated with poor outcome, 
especially after anoxic injury,119 although treatment by 
hypothermia might challenge the prognostic utility of 
this approach. Preliminary ERP data show some prog-
nostic value in patients with chronic DOC.118 Brainstem 
auditory ERPs to a stream of simple beeps are not very 
informative in the diagnosis or prognosis of DOC. By 
contrast, auditory oddball ERPs, which detect process-
ing of novelty or sound deviance, may help predict good 
outcome in coma and other DOCs.120 Auditory stimuli 
with emotional or autoreferential valence (such as the 
patient’s own name) are more powerful in eliciting a 
corti cal response than are neutral beeps, and their pres-
ence may have prognostic value121 even if it does not 
n ecessarily reflect conscious processing.122
An elegant attempt to develop auditory ERP markers of 
conscious processing can be achieved through measure-
ment of cerebral responses to violations of temporal 
regularities that are both local in time and global across 
several seconds. Local violations lead to an early response 
in auditory cortex, independent of attention and, prob-
ably, consciousness. Despite the presence of many false 
negatives, global violations lead to a late and spatially 
distributed response that only seems to be present when 
patients are at least minimally conscious.123,124 In addi-
tion, novel effective connectivity measurements of 
classic auditory mismatch negativity ERP paradigms 
allow assessment of top-down processes involved in 
recurrent neuronal message-passing and the generation 
of long-latency electrophysiological responses, provid-
ing another possible correlate of c onscious perception 
in DOC.125
As in fMRI, ERP recordings can be obtained in both 
passive and active paradigms. In one study, patients 
with DOC listened through headphones to a series of 
names including their own name or other names, in both 
passive and active conditions.126 In the active condition, 
patients were instructed to count the number of times 
they heard their own name or another target name, and 
the increase in P3 amplitude (known to depend on atten-
tion) was taken as a marker of response. This approach 
led to detection of consciousness in a rare case of total 
LIS.127 An earlier case involving a patient with total LIS 
secondary to amytrophic lateral sclerosis also success-
fully used ERP recordings for detection of active cogni-
tion.128 Other studies have used motor imagery to detect 
command-related EEG changes in MCS129 and some 
rare VS cases130 in the absence of overt motor behav-
iour. An independent re-analysis of the data from the 
latter study,131 however, identified statistical flaws and 
failed to reproduce the initial findings, illustrating the 
challenge of developing reliable statistical classifiers 
of ERP data in DOC. Indeed, in the absence of a gold 
standard for measuring consciousness,19,83 active func-
tional neuroimaging or neurophysiological tools must 
strike a balance between avoidance of false-positive and 
false-negative errors.
Conversion of active EEG paradigms (also referred to 
as brain–computer interface [BCI] technology) into a reli-
able communication tool in the context of DOC remains 
challenging.132 Most BCI systems have been developed 
for paralysed or LIS patients, but may not work in MCS 
because of fluctuations in vigilance and limitations in 
attention span. For example, a four-choice auditory 
oddball EEG-BCI paradigm, which had been validated in 
healthy controls and cognitively intact patients with LIS, 
revealed reliable command-following in a patient in MCS 
but could not be converted into a functional communi-
cation system.133 Also, non-EEG-based systems, such as 
measurement of subclinical electro myography (EMG) 
signals,134 pupil dilation during mental calculation135 or 
changes in salivary pH,136 can be used to identify covert 
signs of c ommand-followin g in DOC.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
TMS of the motor cortex, coupled with EMG response 
detection (that is, motor ERPs) is used to assess cortical 
excitability, which is decreased in DOC and correlates 
with level of consciousness.137 TMS coupled to simulta-
neous EEG recordings is a promising method to assess 
cerebral effective connectivity and consciousness138 while 
bypassing subcortical afferent and efferent pathways, 
and does not require active participation or language 
comprehension. In VS, TMS has been shown to trigger 
a simple, local EEG response, similar to deep sleep or 
anaesthesia.37 In MCS, TMS–EEG shows complex activa-
tions that involve distant cortical areas, similar to LIS and 
conscious controls.37 Longitudinal PCI measurements 
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performed in patients who recovered consciousness 
revealed a clear-cut change in TMS-EEG connectivity 
and complexity measures, sometimes occurring before 
clinical communication could be established.36
Strengths and limitations
Each of the neuroimaging approaches described above 
has advantages and limitations relating to the type of 
measurement, degree of spatiotemporal resolution, 
level of expertise required, and cost and availability. 
Table 3 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of 
these procedures.
Treatment interventions
Clinical management of patients with DOC has two 
primary aims: prevention of secondary medical complica-
tions and restoration of cognitive–behavioural functions. 
Medical complications can arise as a direct result of the 
brain injury (for example, development of contractures), 
as an indirect consequence of the injury (for example, 
aspiration pneumonia), or as the result of treatment (for 
example, sedative effects of analgesics). Restorative inter-
ventions focus on promoting recovery of consciousness, 
communication and functional competency.
Prevention and management of complications
The incidence of medical complications in patients with 
DOC undergoing rehabilitation during the first 16 weeks 
post-injury is high, resulting in rehospitalization in 
approximately 15% of events.139 Whyte et al. followed 
181 rehabilitation inpatients in traumatic VS or MCS 
over a 6-week period, and found the median number 
of medical complications experienced per patient to be 
2 (range 0–9).140 The five most common complications 
were hypertonia/spasticity (8.3%), urinary tract infection 
(6.4%), agitation/aggression (6.4%), sleep disturbance 
(6.2%), and hyperkinesia/motor restlessness (4.7%). 
Pneumonia was relatively infrequent (3%) but was typi-
cally rated as severe, and was the most common reason 
for acute-care transfer.
Infection, dysautonomia, neuromuscular dysfunc-
tion, hydrocephalus, seizures, shunt malfunctions and 
other complications in patients with DOC require early 
detection and aggressive management with medical, 
ortho paedic and rehabilitation procedures. Prophylactic 
treatments should be initiated to prevent high-risk 
complications, including deep vein thrombosis, cardiac 
problems, hypercholesterolaemia, hypertension and hypo-
tension, and diabetes. Neuromuscular complications can 
be effectively managed with intrathecal baclofen pumps, 
botulinum toxin, nerve and muscle blocks, oral anti-
spasmodics, and physical interventions including ice, heat 
and vibration.141–144 Aggressive pain management should 
always be initiated for patients in MCS,79,145–147 as their 
capacity for subjective awareness of pain is preserved.
Enhancement of recovery
A wide array of behavioural, pharmacological and other 
rehabilitation-oriented treatments are routinely admin-
istered in patients with DOCs, but few interventions 
have been rigorously shown to accelerate or enhance 
functional recovery,148 owing in part to the logistical 
and methodological difficulties of conducting placebo-
controlled trials in this population.149 Here, we review 
the treatments used to enhance arousal level, drive, 
c ommunication ability, and executive control processes.
Physical management strategies
Physical medicine procedures are routinely employed 
in patients with DOC on the premise that strengthen-
ing and conditioning exercises can maximize recov-
ery of spared neurological functions. This approach 
relies on traditional physical therapy techniques and 
includes passive range-of-motion exercises, prolonged 
muscle stretch, serial casting, and positioning proto-
cols. A review of 17 studies involving paediatric patients 
in VS or MCS concluded that the available evidence 
for the effectiveness of treatments for spasticity and 
reduced range of motion was inconclusive.144 By con-
trast, a retro spective study of 38 individuals with initial 
Table 3 | Strengths and limitations of neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques in DOC
Technique Measurement 
type








FDG‑PET Metabolic Relatively direct measure 




+ – – + + + + – –
Functional 
MRI
CBF Permits both high‑resolution 
structural imaging of grey and 
white matter (DTI) and 
functional imaging 
(spectroscopy, resting, passive 
and active CBF paradigms)
Sensitive to movement artefacts 
requiring sedation/anaesthesia
Incompatible with ferromagnetic 
material (derivation, pumps, 
electrodes)
+ + – + + +
EEG/ERPs Electrical Easy, repeatable, portable 
and cheap
Muscle, eye and dysautonomia 
artefacts
Challenging source reconstruction
– – + + + – + +
EEG–TMS Electrical Stereotaxic stimulation 
connectivity studies
Stimulation areas limited by 
muscle artefacts
(–) + + + + + – –
Abbreviations: +, high; –, low; CBF, cerebral blood flow; DOC, disorders of consciousness; DTI, diffusion tensor imaging; ERPs, event‑related potentials; FDG, 18F‑fluorodeoxyglucose; TMS, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation.
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Glasgow Coma Scale scores <9 found that ratings on the 
Levels of Cognitive Functioning Scale150 and the per-
centage of home discharges were significantly higher for 
the 17 patients who received an aggressive, formal pro-
gramme of multidisciplinary rehabilitation during the 
acute hospitalization, as compared with 21 patients who 
received no formal rehabilitative treatment.151
Pharmacological interventions
Two medications intended to modulate key neurotrans-
mitter systems that mediate arousal, attention and drive 
functions have demonstrated effectiveness in ran-
domized clinical trials. Giacino, Whyte and colleagues 
administered amantadine or placebo for 4 weeks to 
184 rehabilitation inpatients who were in VS or MCS 
at 4–16  weeks post-injury.2 Participants received 
200–400 mg of the study drug depending on the degree of 
change detected weekly on the Disability Rating Scale,152 
followed by a 2-week washout.2 During the 4-week treat-
ment period, rates of recovery were signifi cantly faster 
in the amantadine group, regardless of whether patients 
were enrolled early (28–70 days) or late (71–112 days) 
post-injury, or whether they were in VS or MCS at 
baseline. The rate of improvement slowed significantly 
during the washout phase, but the gains demonstrated 
in the amantadine group were maintained after treat-
ment discontinuation. In addition, a greater proportion 
of the amantadine-treated patients recovered the ability 
to follow commands consistently, answer yes–no ques-
tions accurately, use objects in a functional manner, 
and speak intelligibly. After 4 weeks of treatment, 18% 
of the amanta dine group remained in VS, compared 
with 31% of the placebo group. These results provide 
strong support for the effectiveness of amantadine in 
a ccelerating the pace of recovery in patients with DOC.
Zolpidem, a selective omega-1 γ-aminobutyric acid 
(GABA) agonist with soporific properties, has been 
reported, paradoxically, to produce marked improve-
ments in the consistency and complexity of behavioural 
responses in some patients with DOC.153–160 Whyte and 
Myers157 conducted a placebo-controlled, double-blind, 
crossover trial in 15 patients who had been in VS or 
MCS for at least 1 month following traumatic or non-
traumatic brain injury. Zolpidem (10 mg) or placebo was 
administered in blinded order on two different occa-
sions, separated by 1–7 days. Behavioural responses to 
standardized prompts from the CRS-R were recorded 
every hour for 5 h following each dose. The authors 
reported that one patient, who had been in traumatic 
VS for over 4 years, temporarily transitioned from VS 
to MCS following administration of zolpidem, but not 
placebo. Command-following, visual pursuit and auto-
matic social gestures (for example, waving) re-emerged 
after receiving zolpidem on two separate occasions, but 
not after receiving placebo. The remaining 14 patients 
failed to show significant differences in response to zolpi-
dem and placebo. A recent prospective open-label study 
also failed to find any significant improvement (that is, 
change in diagnosis) in a cohort of 60 chronic patients 
with DOC (31 with traumatic brain injury).161
Central thalamic deep brain stimulation
Central thalamic DBS (CT-DBS) is designed to modu-
late neural circuits that mediate arousal, attention 
and drive.41,162 A surgically implanted pulse generator 
delivers a train of electrical impulses to targeted nuclei 
within the central thalamus that are anatomically and 
physiologically specialized to control arousal, sus-
tained attention, working memory, and motor inten-
tion networks. The objective is to activate viable cortical 
 networks that have become downregulated as a result of 
mesodiencephalic dysfunction.
Schiff et al. devised a prospective, double-blind, 
alternating crossover design to test the effectiveness of 
CT-DBS in a small series of patients who had remained 
in MCS for over 12 months.46 Standardized outcome 
measures with pre-established reliability and validity 
were used to capture behavioural changes related to 
CT-DBS. In the initial case, a 36-year-old male who had 
been in post-traumatic MCS for over 6 years received 
bilateral CT-DBS in alternating 30-day on–off cycles for 
a 6-month period. During CT-DBS-on periods, signifi-
cant improvements were observed in arousal level, func-
tional movements of the upper extremities, and oral 
feeding. Behavioural performance in these domains 
decreased significantly during the CT-DBS-off periods, 
but remained well above baseline level, suggesting carry-
over effects. Functional gains were maintained across the 
24-month open-label follow-up phase. While this case 
provides ‘proof of principle’ that DBS can promote mean-
ingful behavioural improvement well after the accepted 
period of spontaneous recovery, predictors of response 
remain unknown and require further study.
Other treatments
A wide range of other treatments, including structured 
sensory stimulation,163 repetitive TMS,164 hyperbaric 
oxygen,165 and various dopaminergic and GABAergic 
medications,166 have been administered to patients with 
DOCs, but the evidence is insufficient to formulate 
r ecommendations regarding their use in clinical practice.
Ethical and policy considerations
Care context
Despite considerable progress in the DOC research 
field, the care of many patients with these conditions 
remains inadequate. Patients with DOC continue to 
encounter a health-care system that views their con-
dition as hopeless and beyond remediation.167 This 
pervasive n ihilism—a legacy of the right-to-die move-
ment, which first affirmed choice at life’s end4 in cases 
such as Quinlan and Schiavo168,169—influences practice 
patterns,170 viewing patients with severe brain injury 
through an end-of-life prism, leaving them marginalized 
and sequestered from the evolving fruits of neuroscience 
(J. J. Fins, u npublished work).171
Institutional Review Board-approved interviews of 
families participating in research conducted at Weill 
Cornell Medical College and Liège University Hospital 
tell a counter-tale to the brilliant science that has been 
reviewed in the sections above (J. J. Fins, unpublished 
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work). Outside elite centres, the status quo is grim, 
with families reporting a pervasive culture of neglect. 
Prognoses often lack nuance, and are invariably viewed 
as poor. Despite observations that 68% of patients with 
traumatic brain injury on inpatient rehabilitation ser-
vices regained consciousness and, of those, close to 20% 
regained functional independence,8 families of patients 
in the acute care setting are routinely counselled to make 
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining thera-
pies, pursue palliative care recommendations or consent 
to organ donation before a patient’s prognosis—or even 
diagnosis—is clear (J. J. Fins, unpublished work).171–175
Access to rehabilitation
Patients who have neither died from their injuries nor 
succumbed to pressures to withhold or withdraw care face 
substantial challenges on discharge from hospital. If they 
remain in VS, they may be sent for ‘custodial care’, often to 
nursing homes or other facilities that are unable to handle 
medical conditions that can occur after severe brain 
injury, such as central hyperthermia (J. J. Fins, unpub-
lished work). In these facilities, patients will not receive 
intensive rehabilitation, and might develop complica-
tions of immobility, including bedsores and decreased 
range of motion. Evolution of their condition to MCS, as 
is expected in 50% of traumatic brain injury cases, is likely 
to go unnoticed given the intermittent evidence of con-
sciousness that a patient in MCS displays.176 The episodic 
nature of these behaviours, coupled with the expectations 
of clinicians in these settings, can cause family observa-
tions of behaviours suggestive of MCS to be ascribed to 
denial. One study reported a 41% rate of misdiagnosis of 
MCS as VS.48 Notable patients like Terry Wallis have been 
misdiagnosed as vegetative for decades,177 their true con-
dition only being recognized when they recovered further 
and emerged from MCS.178
Patients who are candidates for rehabilitation 
will encounter eligibility requirements that severely 
limit access to care. As recently discussed by Whyte 
and Nakase-Richardson,179 the admission criteria of 
McKesson Health Solutions—a Fortune 500 company 
that works with insurance companies to develop utiliza-
tion review and care pathways—would effectively deprive 
many patients with DOC of access to inpatient rehabilita-
tion after hospital discharge. Following guidelines set out 
under McKesson’s InterQual criteria,180 eligibility for acute 
inpatient rehabilitation would require that patients be at 
a level of ‘Rancho III and evolving’, which is equivalent 
to MCS and above.150,181 As noted by Whyte and Nakase-
Richardson,179 one problem with these criteria is that 
patients would have to demonstrate progress every day.
While it is readily appreciated that patients need 
to be interactive enough to participate in rehabilita-
tion, and could, in theory, go to less-intensive care set-
tings and be sent back to acute rehabilitation when they 
were ready, this rarely occurs in practice in both the USA 
and Europe. Whyte and Nakase-Richardson179 argue that 
the InterQual criteria keep patients from being prop-
erly assessed to see whether they could participate. The 
authors also note that ‘evolving’ implies too high a rate of 
progress, thereby excluding patients who are improving 
at a slower pace yet still retain the biological potential for 
significant recovery. An alternative ‘front-loaded’ model 
was proposed by the authors of the Mohonk Report,182 
who suggested that patients should receive a period of 
acute rehabilitation after hospitalization, so as to enable 
full assessment by the skilled personnel best able to dis-
tinguish MCS from VS, and to identify patients who 
would benefit from rehabilitation. After a proper period 
of assessment and treatment, responders would continue 
in acute rehabilitation, whereas non-responders would 
be sent to subacute or chronic care venues. To date, these 
recommendations have not been accepted by USA policy 
makers and third parties (for example, McKesson).
For those patients who are admitted to inpatient rehab-
ilitation, length of stay can be brief. In the USA, most 
spoke of 6-week courses of care, a time frame that can 
be inconsistent with the biological pace of recovery.183,184 
Length of stay can be predetermined by insurance cover-
age or depend on bureaucratic models of care. In both 
the USA and many European countries (for example, the 
Netherlands), access to and  reimbursement for ongoing 
rehabilitation is determined by a construct called medical 
necessity, which requires the behavioural demonstration 
of improvement to garner benefits. The benchmarks of 
progress that are used to determine medical necessity 
are inconsistent with MCS. For example, if a patient 
demon strated an appropriate behaviour on a few occa-
sions but failed to repeat that capability consistently, the 
first response would not be taken as evidence of pro gress. 
Episodic behaviours are inherent to the definition of 
MCS, highlighting the need for coverage metrics better 
suited to such conditions.73
A more integrated and comprehensive approach 
to care, linking academic medical centres, hospitals, 
acute in patient rehabilitation and chronic care settings 
(as currently existing in some European countries, 
such as Belgium), has been proposed by the Mohonk 
Group,182 and implemented in part by the US Veterans 
Administration,185 but care remains fragmented for 
most patients once they leave rehabilitation. Truncated 
in patient rehabilitation stays are particularly problematic 
because this might be the only course of rehabilitation that 
a patient obtains before placement in less-intensive set-
tings. Patients are often lost to follow-up in chronic care 
when they would still benefit from rehabilitation services.
Medicolegal and regulatory issues
Research and treatment in patients in MCS is compli-
cated by the lack of decision-making capacity. Inability 
to provide consent for research participation may lead to 
either surrogate authorization or outright prohibition 
of research without the patient’s autonomous consent. 
The latter would generally be the case when the pro-
posed research is more than minimal-risk and does not 
hold the prospect of direct medical benefit, such as in a 
phase I study. If consent cannot be obtained because of 
decisional incapacity, it would seem logical to expand 
the discretion of surrogates to make judgements about 
research participation—with proper safeguards and 
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assurances—especially if the objective of the interven-
tion is to restore autonomous voices to individuals with 
DOC (J. J. Fins, unpublished work).4,46,186–189
A related topic is the use of guardianship. Though 
designed to protect the interests of decisionally incapaci-
tated patients, and to make decisions that are consist-
ent with the patient’s previously expressed wishes and 
values, guardianship designations can sometimes 
deprive patients of their rights.190,191 Given the financial 
resources and legal representation required to reverse 
a guardianship proceeding, guardianships can remain 
in place after a patient has regained decision-making 
capacity, thereby undermining patient autonomy and 
self-determination.192
Guardianship requirements can also promote dual 
agency, serving the interests of institutions rather than 
patients and families. One example encountered in the 
USA is that some states require a guardianship desig-
nation before a patient can be admitted to an inpatient 
rehabilitation hospital. This requirement helps to ensure 
that there is a legally responsible and fiscally accountable 
representative of the patient to assume the costs of care 
and responsibility for placement if benefits run out and 
discharge is required. The imposition of a guardianship 
requirement for admission could exacerbate health inequi-
ties by creating a barrier for the poor and legally under-
served who may have difficulty obtaining the n ecessary 
legal r epresentation for guardianship proceedings.193
Guardianship decisions can also be ethically prob-
lematic when the court intercedes and appoints a guard-
ian over the objection of family members who perceive 
themselves as acting in the best interests of the patient. 
While courts can legitimately intercede to appoint 
a guardian when family discord exists, the situation 
becomes more complicated when the court’s view of the 
patient’s best interests conflicts with that of a unified 
family. Laws differ on this point depending on one’s 
state and country.192 In jurisdictions where this kind of 
judicial intercession is consistent with prevailing law, the 
question arises of whether the court or the family is best-
placed to serve in this key role. The resolution of such 
questions requires knowledge of the particularities of an 
individual case combined with neutral adjudication.
For patients in MCS, what is fundamentally at stake 
is the recognition and cultivation of consciousness. 
Failure to recognize consciousness, encourage relation-
ality and maximally integrate the patient into society 
by fostering functional communication could consti-
tute a violation of the individual’s civil rights (J. J. Fins, 
unpublished work).194
Conclusions
Innovations in the recording and processing of neuro-
imaging and electrophysiological data have produced 
a cornucopia of possibilities to assess the structure and 
function of the brain in DOC. In specialized centres, 
these methods are now being employed to map patterns 
of residual function and dysfunction, help reduce diag-
nostic errors between related conditions such as VS and 
MCS, and improve outcome prediction.195 The future 
integration of ‘high-tech’ brain measurements with 
existing clinical and behavioural methods of assessment 
should pave the way for new and innovative applications, 
and further elucidation of pathophysiological mecha-
nisms could provide new opportunities for restoration of 
function through interventional neuromodulation.46,196 
These emerging technologies also bring new ethical chal-
lenges, and have important implications for medicolegal 
decision-making.197
The novel neuroimaging and electrophysiologi-
cal technologies await large-scale, multicentre valida-
tion studies. Future studies should also follow patients 
longitudinally and focus on multimodal imaging,198,199 
combining and integrating information over time.200,201 
These techniques can provide additional information to 
clarify the clinical significance of ambiguous behavioural 
signs,202 assess the effect of therapeutic interventions, 
and inform patient selection for clinical trials. The data 
should be combined with genomic information about 
neurochemical pathways and genetic polymorphisms 
linked to specific subtypes of DOC, ultimately leading 
to better and more-rational treatment and patient care.
Despite the rapidly growing body of evidence indi-
cating that a substantial percentage of patients with 
DOC recover over time, a belief prevails that these dis-
orders are hopeless and attempts to treat them futile. 
Consequently, many individuals with DOC are trans-
ferred directly from high-intensity acute care facilities 
to custodial settings that are ill-equipped to provide 
the necessary level of specialized assessment and treat-
ment. A pressing need exists to develop a fully integrated 
system of care that is responsive to the complex needs of 
patients with DOC across the different phases of recov-
ery. To this end, new health-care service delivery models 
must be developed that link academic medical centres, 
acute care and neurorehabilitation hospitals, and chronic 
care settings.
In conclusion, findings from neuroimaging and 
electro physiology have identified new ways to assess 
awareness in DOC, and have revealed astounding cases 
of awareness in the setting of behavioural unresponsive-
ness. As a consequence, diagnostic classification systems 
are being rewritten, prognostic knowledge is improv-
ing, and therapeutic studies have regained momentum, 
causing a paradigm shift that is beginning to put an end 
to the era of therapeutic nihilism.203
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